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Tojo and the Coming of the War. By Robert J. C. Butow. (Stanford, C.A.: Stanford University Press, 1969. 584pp. Out of Print


This book casts light on the role of General Tojo Hideki in Imperial Japan’s doomed course beginning late 1920s through the Empire’s ultimate defeat to the United Nations in August 1945. It also deals with the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (the IMTFE) in which the accused Tojo was sentenced to death by hanging in the eyes of the victorious nations. Although the Japanese translation of the work is labeled as a biography, Tojo and the Coming of the War should rather be treated as a historiography that focuses on the most notorious wartime leader of Japan in an attempt to explain the factors that led to the war with the U.S. As Professor Robert J. C. Butow promises “surprise” in his “A Note to the Reader,” he presents a thesis that is contrary to what had been appreciated of Tojo.

Dividing his enormous work into three parts, Professor Butow focuses in the first section on the period which preceded the emergence of Tojo in the political arena on the eve of Pearl Harbor. Here he attempts to demonstrate the foundation for Tojo’s judgments and how his thinking influenced his role in the army as well as the general historical background of the era. Unlike other comrades of his generation, many of who indulged themselves in ultranationalism like Colonel Hashimoto Kingoro, Tojo remained unaffiliated with any such radicalism. He was, however, a typical obedient bureaucrat who “would not allow political censure to interfere with the prestige of the army which he served” (71).



After the deterioration of the Imperial Way Faction as a result of its abortive coup d’état in winter 1936, Tojo quickly ascended the elite course of the army by becoming the Chief of Staff of Kwantung Army in 1937, the Vice Minister of War in 1938. His rapid success in the army owed much to his candor and competence as a military bureaucrat. At the same time, however, Butow points out the general’s narrow view and lack of understanding of international affairs. Tojo’s rejection of diplomacy as a means to solve international tensions, in particular, received attention (46). Such sentiment, which commanded Tojo’s judgments and prevailed throughout the army, was a major factor which would plunge Japan into a quagmire of full-scale war in China.

In the second part of his book, Professor Butow probes Tojo’s role at the height of his career when Japan was heading toward the ominous climax. After the War Minister Hata’s resignation, Tojo succeeded. Butow asserts that Tojo’s ascent to the portfolio “was the result of orthodox administrative procedures” and was a “logical choice” (143~144). This implies that no political inclinations were considered. Moreover, the professor’s analysis of Tojo as the War Minister holds that “[he] was not so much an initiator of policies as a promoter of them and propagandist for them” (146). In other words, the War Minister somehow lacked the power officially bestowed upon him. So did other key figures like the vice-chiefs of staff.



The real powers that be, Butow suggests, were the nucleus group called the “chuken shoko.” “Chuken Shoko” is defined as “the mainstay group of officers at the center” consisting of “somewhat older, higher-ranking career men” (36). They took advantage of the liaison conference where not only did they draw up policies, but also “made the decisions” (149). The author also argues that the nucleus group penetrated into every aspect of foreign affairs and that “it was the military and not the civilians who were prescribing the course of Japan’s foreign policy” (151). Thus the “chuken shoko” trampled on civilian control and Japan was now a de facto militarist regime. In the end, subjugating to their control the military, the civilian bureaucracy, and even the Emperor as puppets, the middle-ranking masterminds exerted full control over the state affairs.

In the third section, Butow presents a summary of the aftermath of the decisions made by Tojo and his colleagues. The section examines the connection between the years between Japan’s decision for war and of trial by the victors. Here the author presents yet another startling thesis that Tojo was not a dictator like Hitler or Mussolini. He argues that “Tojo was a reflector, not a creator, of national thought.” He was merely “a militarist --- misguided, naïve, and narrow in outlook; he regarded war as a legitimate instrument of national policy; he apparently believed what he had told the court and failed to recognize the patent contradictions between his contentions and the facts” (504). This striking antithesis is somewhat reinforced by account of the former general who was now stripped of his title, medals, and honors and did not at all look aggressive. The following poem written by Tojo during his years of trial summarizes Butow’s point well:

Juyo kyutsu

Ten no mei nari

Whether life is long or short,

Whether we succeed or fail,

Is in accordance with the will of Heaven (540).

While admitting that Tojo was not a villain, Butow maintains his firm position throughout the book that Japan should bear the greatest war responsibility which is attributed to the leaders like Tojo. This is due to the fact that Japan’s own opportunism and rejection of diplomacy invited her own misfortune.



Professor Butow’s diligent research allowed for all these unprecedented discoveries and assessments of Japan’s path toward her demise in relation to Tojo’s political role. The bibliography itself accounts for eighteen pages. Above all, as an American historian of Japanese descent, the professor effectively utilizes a massive number of primary sources in the Japanese language, which heretofore had hampered the study of Japanese history by Western scholars such as Kido Koichi Nikki. Moreover, his research during the early days of postwar Japan enabled him to interview crucial figures from the close associates of Tojo including the Chief Cabinet Secretary under the Tojo Cabinet, Hoshino Naoki to participants of the Tokyo war crimes trial such as George F. Blewett, who was the American defense attorney for the fallen general. His careful survey of the wartime leader based upon such rare sources allowed him to construct a startlingly unique portrayal of Tojo Hideki, which challenges the image rendered by the Tokyo trial and casts considerable doubts on it.

In this sense, Professor Butow’s work is an enormous contribution to the English language literature on Japanese political history. His research skillfully reconstructs Tojo’s political life along with the Japanese politics per se during those turbulent years of the Empire by providing a massive number of primary sources and numerous interviews of those who had direct contact with the man in question. Therefore, this book should be deemed a major victory for the critique of the so-called “Tokyo trial view of history,” a term used mainly by conservative Japanese historians to refer to the negative image imposed upon Japan as a result of the trial.

Most importantly, the author deserves credit for his refutation of the “conspiracy theory” developed by the Prosecution which applied the Anglo-American legal principle of criminal conspiracy at the tribunal. According to Francis B. Sayre, under the doctrine of criminal conspiracy, “everyone who acts in cooperation with another may some day find his liberty dependent upon the innate prejudices or social bias of unknown judge” (Sayre 413, 427). In other words, criminal conspiracy is different from the layman’s term “conspiracy” in which there must be a secret agreement by two or more members. Therefore, Tojo or most other Class-A war criminals, who were robots manipulated by “chuken shoko”, would inevitably fall prey to such a principle. Thus the Prosecution successfully employed a convenient tool called criminal conspiracy to develop a fallacious view of history that Japan’s aggression in Asia and the Pacific was a product of careful planning by bloodthirsty villainous militarists.

However, such an interpretation can easily be dismissed by that of Butow, who posits that narrow-sighted, opportunistic, and irresponsible militarist decision-makers who made policies on a whim without considering consequences were the root cause of the war. Butow’s interpretation of Tojo as an ordinary militarist instead of a fanatical dictator further strengthens his antithesis to the conspiracy theory. The Japanese warlords from the IMTFE were conspirators only under the Anglo-American legal culture. Thus Butow’s discoveries demand a drastic change in our appreciation of the Tokyo trial.

While readers are startled by his striking thesis, they soon realize that the author fails to present clearly the origins of judgments upon which Tojo’s decisions were based. Based on Butow’s interpretation that Tojo was “a prisoner of his environment and training” (27), it is easy to conclude that much of the foundation of his judgments originated in his youth. His experiences at the Military Academy and the Army War College, in particular, should deserve special attention.

However, the professor discusses little about them. According to Kurono Taeru, the education at War College shaped the thinking shared by a majority of army officials including Tojo. Kurono argues that at the time Lieutenant General Ishiwara Kanji was the only officer who could incorporate other factors than military affairs such as international politics into his judgments. His “special” ability owed much to his private studies outside his formal education. Ishiwara spent a significant amount of time reading books on subjects other than military studies such as philosophy, sociology, and history. Kurono concludes that education at those military schools created narrow-sighted officers like Tojo, who were responsible for the demise of the empire (220~221). Butow’s work fails to shed light upon this crucial point.

For this reason, the comparison of the two contrasting egos, namely Ishiwara and Tojo, would have made the work more convincing. Ishiwara was more of a philosopher or an ideologue than a narrow-minded military officer while Tojo was a typical military bureaucrat of the time. The following excerpt from the interview conducted during the Tokyo trial of the former commenting on his colleague during his service to the Kwantung Army deserves attention:

“[Tojo] is a pay officer. He is errorless in putting ten weapons in order if commanded to do so, but at other things, he is useless. Since he is by nature a type of person who would knife you in the back, he does not hesitate to demote those whom he does not like. Well, instead of there being only figures like him around at that time, I think that it is more convenient to say that people like Tojo were put into key posts like War Minister. Muto certainly took advantage of the situation of the time. A kind of situation where lower-ranking officers manipulated higher-ranking ones permeated throughout Japan. I heard that Tojo had been keeping notes in the court. But behold, I am sure that he does not even know how to use his own notes” (Abe 593).

This harsh critique of the fallen general resonates well with the thesis presented by Butow. Moreover, the identification of these two egos with the comparison between Philip II of the Spanish Empire whose narrow-sightedness drove the empire to demise and Friedrich II of Prussia whose diplomatic skills in addition to his military strategy brought about victory to the nation that was on the verge of destruction would have further reinforced Butow’s thesis.

Altogether, backed up by his patient utilization of a massive number of primary sources in both Japanese and English, Professor Butow presents an invaluable work on General Tojo Hideki with fresh insights into his political life as well as late-Imperial Japan’s political history. Yet, he fails to probe the origin of the narrow judgments shared by a majority of men in the army including Tojo. Fortunately, an increasing number of historians like Kurono have studied this issue and if supplemented with their works, one can truly appreciate Professor Butow’s work.

Bibliography

Abe, Hiiroyuki. “Ishiwara Kanji: syogai to sono jidai.” Tokyo: Hosei UP, 2005

Francis B. Sayre, “Criminal Conspiracy,” 35 Harvard Law Review, 1922, pp.427, 413;

Kuurono, Taemu. “Sanbou honbu to Rikigun daigakko.” Tokyo: koudansya gendai shinsyo, 2004

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